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PRIVACY AND THE
PANDEMIC
AS THE UNITED States struggles to contain the spread of COVID-19, epidemiological 
surveillance programs like digital 
contact tracing have been touted as 
a critical tool to enable states not 
only to reopen their economies, 
but also to do so without a 
resurgence of infections. During 
May and June 2020, members 
of Congress introduced multiple 
bills to regulate data collection, 
processing, and use in connection 
with the COVID-19 pandemic, 
including for digital contact tracing. 
 
Contact tracing has long been a 
central component of public health 
response to infectious disease. 
Traditionally, a contact tracer 
interviews infected individuals 
to identify all other individuals 
with whom they may have been 
in contact. A contact tracer 
then notifies these contacts that 
they may be infected, assists in 
monitoring for symptoms, and may 
instruct contacts to quarantine. 
Traditional contact tracing 
thus relies on skilled workers. 
Done well, contact tracing, in 
combination with widespread 
testing and quarantining of 
contacts, can short circuit 
pathways of infection. As of June 
2020, more than 1,400 contact 
tracers were already at work 
throughout the state of Maryland.  
Many jurisdictions have also 
expressed interest in utilizing 
digital data to assist the work 
of human contact tracers, if not 
replace it. Should the United 
States—or any individual state—
embrace digital contact tracing, 
and how might such a program 
be structured to maximize its 
asserted benefits while limiting 
its harms? In a recent paper, my 
Maryland Carey Law colleague 
David Gray and I argue that the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution supplies an answer.  
 
The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees that “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be 
violated.” This protection likely 
regulates the use of location data 
for epidemiological purposes, 
as private app developers are 
likely to be deemed state agents 
for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. Policymakers 
nonetheless have substantial 
latitude to develop these 
epidemiological programs 
within the broad constraints of 
the “special needs” doctrine. 
Significantly, special needs 
searches generally do not require a 
warrant. 
 
But the special doctrine does 
not sign a constitutional blank 
check, permitting unregulated and 
mass digital location tracking. 
The Fourth Amendment requires 
prospective constraints on 
searches and the discretionary 
authority of agents to conduct 
them. Policymakers must ask hard 
questions about efficacy, including 
the comparative advantages of 
digital location tracking versus 
more traditional contact tracing 
methods. There are good reasons 
to be skeptical. Current consumer 
location tracking tools—
whether GPS or Bluetooth—are 
insufficiently precise to capture 
only close contacts, and they 
cannot account for beneficial 
features like mask wearing. 
Moreover, a lack of robust social 
supports may make quarantine 
economically infeasible for many. 
Without appropriate technological 
and social infrastructure, digital 
contact tracing is likely to sacrifice 
substantial privacy for only a myth 
of public health benefit.  
 
Even if the public health 
benefits of digital contact 
tracing can be established, the 
Fourth Amendment requires 
that policymakers take threats 
to privacy seriously. Robust 
programmatic safeguards must be 
put in place to secure both privacy 
and liberty, including limitations 
on data gathering, aggregation, 
storage, access, analysis, and 
use. In particular, data gathered 
and stored for contact tracing 
must not be used beyond its 
justified purpose. Permitting 
law enforcement or immigration 
officials to access this data would 
both undermine public trust 
(and hence the efficacy of any 
program) and make such searches 
constitutionally unjustified. 
 
Finally, policymakers must set 
clear plans for decommissioning 
surveillance programs. Under 
such a framework, we may yet 
achieve legitimate public health 
goals as we face COVID-19 while 
also living up to our constitutional 
commitments. ■
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